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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3144 
___________ 
 
PAULETTE TITUS-MORRIS, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BANC OF AMERICA CARD SERVICING CORP.* 
 
*Caption amended by Clerk’s Order dated August 22, 2012 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-09-cv-00965) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 25, 2013 
Before:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and BARRY, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: January 31, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In 2009, Paulette Titus-Morris filed a pro se complaint in the United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware against her former employer, Banc of America Card 
Servicing Corp. (“the Bank”), alleging that her termination was the result of employment 
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discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
The Bank moved for summary judgment, asserting that Titus-Morris’s termination was 
the lawful result of her substandard job performance.   On March 30, 2012, the District 
Court granted the Bank’s motion.  On July 27, 2012, Titus-Morris filed this appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment, using the same standard 
applied by the District Court.  See Alcoa, Inc. v. United States
      I. 
, 509 F.3d 173, 175 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant demonstrates “that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
                                              
1 The Bank argues that we lack appellate jurisdiction because Titus-Morris’s notice of 
appeal was untimely filed.  Ordinarily, the time for filing a notice of appeal in a case like 
this is 30 days.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  That time limit is jurisdictional.  Bowles 
v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210 (2007); Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 
2012).  Here, however, the District Court’s entry of judgment violated the “separate 
document rule” set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), which requires that “[e]very judgment 
and amended judgment must be set out in a separate document.”  In order for a judgment 
to be considered set out in a separate document, it “must be separately titled and 
captioned, not paginated consecutively to the opinion or memorandum, not stapled or 
otherwise attached to the opinion, and must be docketed separately.”  LeBoon v. 
Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, 503 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2007).  In this case, the 
District Court’s judgment was not docketed separately and was contained within an 
accompanying memorandum, even appearing before the memorandum’s final page.  
Because the District violated the separate document rule, the 30-day time limit to file a 
notice of appeal began to run 150 days from the March 30, 2012, entry of judgment.  See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c).  Therefore, Titus-Morris’s July 27, 2012 notice of appeal was 
timely filed and we have jurisdiction. 
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 From 2003 until her termination in 2007, Titus-Morris worked for the Bank as a 
fraud analyst.2
 On February 2, 2007, Titus-Morris requested a meeting with Steve Ryder, the 
Bank’s Operational Director for Fraud Application Prevention.  During the meeting, 
Titus-Morris expressed complaints about several of her former managers, alleging that 
she had been subjected to various instances of religious, sexual, and racial discrimination 
during the course of her employment.  Ryder informed Titus-Morris that he would look 
into her allegations.  He also told her that the Bank was in the process of determining 
what course of action to pursue in light of her substandard job performance for three 
  Her job was to review potentially fraudulent credit card applications and 
render decisions approving or denying them.  The Bank evaluated her performance using 
standardized metrics based on (1) the number of approval or denial decisions she made 
per hour (“productivity level”); and (2) the quality of those decisions (“quality level”).  
Fraud analysts were expected to maintain a productivity level of at least 90 percent of the 
standard rate and a quality level of at least 96 percent of the standard rate.  In November 
2006, Titus-Morris’s productivity level did not meet the Bank’s requirements.  In 
December 2006, her quality level did not meet the Bank’s requirements.  Titus-Morris’s 
manager thereafter informed her that she would be given a final warning if she 
underperformed for a third consecutive month.  In January 2007, neither Titus-Morris’s 
productivity level nor her quality level met the Bank’s requirements. 
                                              
2 Titus-Morris was originally hired by MBNA Corporation and subsequently became an 
employee of the Bank following a merger of the two corporations. 
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consecutive months.  On February 5, 2007, Ryder followed up with Titus-Morris’s 
former managers and concluded that her complaints were meritless.  On February 8, 
2007, he met with Titus-Morris to administer a final warning for failure to meet 
performance expectations.  He also informed Titus-Morris that he had met with her 
managers and concluded that the complaints she made on February 2 were baseless.  
Shortly after the February 8 meeting with Ryder, Titus-Morris sent an email to the 
Bank’s CEO and Card Services Executive in which she repeated substantially the same 
complaints about her managers that she had presented to Ryder.  Mark Morris, a human 
resources official at the Bank, investigated Titus-Morris’s complaints and, on February 
21, 2007, informed her that her allegations were unsubstantiated and that the performance 
warnings that had recently been issued against her were justified and would stand. 
 Titus-Morris’s productivity level for February 2007 fell far below the Bank’s 
requirements.  On March 2, 2007, Ryder again met with Titus-Morris to discuss her 
performance.  Thereafter, for the first two weeks of March, Titus-Morris’s productivity 
level remained far below the Bank’s requirements.  On March 16, 2007, Ryder informed 
Titus-Morris that she was terminated due to continued substandard job performance.  
Following her termination, Titus-Morris filed with the Delaware Department of Labor a 
Charge of Discrimination, which was later transferred to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).  The EEOC was unable to determine that the Bank 
had violated Title VII and issued a right-to-sue letter.  Titus-Morris thereafter filed in the 
District Court a pro se civil rights complaint under Title VII. 
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      II. 
  We analyze Titus-Morris’s discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII 
according to the familiar burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  See Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., 
192 F.3d 378, 385-86 (3d Cir. 1999).  Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Titus-
Morris bore the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of a Title VII violation.  
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  If she succeeded, the burden then would shift 
to the Bank to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for her termination.  
See id.  Titus-Morris would then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the legitimate reason for her termination offered by the Bank was a pretext.  
See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.
 We agree with the District Court that Titus-Morris has not established a prima 
facie case of Title VII discrimination arising from her termination.  To establish such a 
prima facie case, she needed to show that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was 
qualified for the position she sought to retain; (3) she was subjected to an adverse 
employment action; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an 
inference that the adverse action was taken because of her membership in the protected 
class.  
, 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). 
See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008).  The Bank concedes that 
Titus-Morris belongs to a protected class, and that her termination constituted an adverse 
employment action.  We also agree with the District Court that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that she was qualified for the position she sought to retain, considering her 
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ability to periodically meet the Bank’s performance expectations in the years prior to her 
termination.  However, we conclude that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that 
Titus-Morris’s termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of 
discrimination. 
 Titus-Morris supports her argument that her termination constituted discrimination 
by citing various discrete instances of alleged religious, sexual, and racial discrimination 
during the course of her employment.  These occurrences are not individually actionable 
because, as the District Court concluded, they are barred by the applicable 300-day 
statute of limitations.  See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(e)(1); Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 
F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 2000).  Moreover, because each of the alleged discriminatory acts 
occurred outside of the limitations period, they cannot in the aggregate form the basis for 
a hostile work environment claim.  See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 
101, 117 (2002).  However, Titus-Morris may cite those discrete occurrences as 
background evidence in support of her timely claim that her eventual termination 
constituted unlawful discrimination under Title VII.  See Morgan
 Titus-Morris first asserted that she was subjected to religious discrimination in 
2004 when one of her managers criticized her leadership qualities as “poor” because her 
religious beliefs prevented her from attending office outings where alcohol was served.  
, 536 U.S. at 113 (prior 
acts that are not actionable because they are time-barred may still be cited as background 
evidence in support of a timely claim).  Nonetheless, we find the occurrences she cites 
insufficient to give rise to an inference that her termination was discriminatory. 
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This performance review is insufficient to establish an inference of religious 
discrimination.  Not only did it occur years before Titus-Morris’s termination, but it 
merely stated that she should be a team player in “all job aspects” and actually provided 
her with a leadership assessment of “Good.”  Titus-Morris next asserted that she was 
subjected to sexual discrimination in 2004 when her male manager would “often yell 
at/correct [her]” in front of her colleagues and would “do the opposite for [her] peers.”  
This assertion, for which Titus-Morris provided no further elaboration or supporting 
documentation, is insufficient to establish an inference of sex discrimination because 
Titus-Morris did not allege that her manager treated her male colleagues differently in 
this respect, stating only that she was generally singled out from her “peers.”  Finally, 
Titus-Morris asserted that she was subjected to racial discrimination based on comments 
made by different white managers in 2006 and early 2007.  For example, she contended 
that one of her managers described her as “cheeky” and “aggressive,” even after she 
informed him that she considered those terms to be veiled racial slurs.  She also alleged 
that, on one occasion, a different manager “carried on” about her head tie and asked why 
“only Black women wear head ties outside of the house.”  We conclude that these and 
other stray remarks cited in the complaint would not permit a reasonable factfinder to 
conclude that her eventual termination constituted racial discrimination.  See Ezold v. 
Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohn
We also conclude that Titus-Morris has not established a prima facie case of 
retaliation.  To establish a prima facie claim of unlawful retaliation under Title VII, Titus-
, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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Morris must show that (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the Bank 
took an adverse action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between the 
protected activity and the adverse action taken by the Bank.  See Moore v. City of Phila.
The sole fact Titus-Morris points to in support of a causal connection is the timing 
of her termination, which occurred less than two months after she made the complaints 
about her managers.  However, the “mere fact that adverse employment action occurs 
after a complaint will ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of 
demonstrating a causal link between the two events.”  
, 
461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006).  Titus-Morris’s retaliation claim is based on her 
February 2, 2007, meeting with Ryder during which she made complaints about her 
former managers and her subsequent email to Bank executives which relayed the same 
complaints.  The Bank does not dispute that Titus-Morris’s complaints about her 
managers to their superiors constitutes activity protected by Title VII, or that her 
termination by the Bank constituted an adverse action.  However, we conclude that Titus-
Morris has not established a causal connection between the complaints and her firing.   
Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 
120 F.3d 1286, 1302 (3d Cir. 1997).  In order to establish a causal connection, the timing 
of her firing would need to be “unusually suggestive” of a retaliatory motive.  See Krouse 
v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997).  Here, Titus-Morris complained 
about her managers only after she had failed to meet performance expectations for the 
previous three months and been informed that her continued employment was in 
jeopardy.  See Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 504-05 (3d Cir. 2000).   
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Finally, even if Titus-Morris were able to establish a prima facie case of Title VII 
discrimination or retaliation arising from her termination by the Bank, she pointed to no 
evidence that would allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the Bank’s stated 
reason for terminating her was a pretext.  See Fuentes v. Perskie
      III. 
, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (in order to demonstrate that an employer’s stated reason for termination was a 
pretext, a plaintiff must point “to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a 
fact finder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate 
reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a 
motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action”).  Here, Titus-Morris does 
not dispute that she failed to meet the Bank’s performance expectations for three 
consecutive months.  She pointed to no evidence suggesting, nor do we find any reason to 
conclude, that the Bank terminated her employment for any other reason. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
